A massive explosion blasted in Beirut on 14 February 2005 claiming the lives of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 21 other people besides the suicide bomber. Right after the assassination, security forces and judicial authorities initiated immediate investigations to bring the perpetrators and their accomplices to justice and confer punishment upon them as supposedly happens in any state. Soon after the explosion, many voiced their distrust in the Lebanese judicial and security authorities and called for an international investigation commission which would refer the case to an international judiciary system through the International Criminal Tribunal or the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon. Consequently, a fact-finding mission was dispatched to Lebanon and an international investigation commission was set up, leading eventually to the establishment of the international tribunal. The commission issued reports highlighting the ongoing progress in uncovering the truth. Mehlis, Brammertz, and Bellmare reports featured contradictive contents that politicized and personalized the truth. However, the final word remains that of the international tribunal.

FitzGerald’s report: Syria responsible for pre-assassination tension

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reported on February 18, 2005 his intention to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Beirut to inquire into the assassination of Hariri and submit a report to the UN Security Council. The mission was led by Irish deputy police commissioner Peter FitzGerald and comprised two police investigators, a political advisor and a legal advisor. The mission concluded its inquiry on March 16, 2005 and the findings were issued on March 25, 2005 as follows:

-  “The specific causes for the assassination of Hariri cannot be reliably asserted until after the perpetrators are brought to justice. However, it is that clear that the assassination took place in a political and security context marked by acute polarization around the Syrian influence in Lebanon.”

-  “Hariri reminded Assad of his pledge not to extend Lahoud’s term, and Assad replied that there had been a policy shift and that the decision was taken. He added that Lahoud should be viewed as his personal representative in Lebanon and that “opposing him is tantamount to opposing Assad himself” and proceeded to say that “he would rather break Lebanon over the heads of Hariri and Jumblatt than see his word challenged.” According to testimonies, Assad then threatened Hariri and Jumblat with physical harm if they opposed the extension of Lahoud’s presidential term.”

-  “The explosion took place aboveground and an amount of no less than 1,000 kg of TNT was used for that end.”

-  “There is no evidence suggesting that Abou Adas could have had the capacity to mastermind and execute the assassination on his own, nor did he have the financial capability.”

Mehlis’ first report: October 25, 2005: Syrian and Lebanese governments involved in the crime

Following the examination of the fact-finding mission report, Lebanon approved of the UN Security Council decision to establish an international independent investigation mission into Hariri’s assassination by virtue of the Resolution 1959 adopted on April 7, 2005. On June 16, 2005, UN Secretary General declared the mission operational. The mission, headed by German investigator Detlev Mehlis submitted its first report on 25 October 2005. The report included the following:

-  “The IIIC was declared operational four months after the actual crime, which means that the perpetrators and their accomplices have had ample time to destroy evidence and/or to collude with each other, the ability to recall of potential witnesses has been diminished and previous omissions and inadvertent or deliberate loss and destruction of evidence cannot be undone.”

-  “The witness Mohammad Zuhair Al-Siddiq visited several Syrian military bases in Lebanon. At one such base in Hammana, he observed a white Mitsubishi van covered with a white tarpaulin over the flatbed. The observations were made on 11, 12 and 13 February 2005. The van left the Hammana base on the morning of February 14, 2005. The Mitsubishi Canter Van, which was used to carry the explosives, entered Lebanon from Syria through the Bekaa border and a military hot lane on 21 January 2005 at 13.20 hrs. It was driven by Syrian Colonel from the Army Tenth Division.”

-  “The investigation shows that eight telephone numbers and ten mobile telephones were used to organize surveillance on Mr. Hariri and to carry out the assassination. The lines were put into circulation on 4 January 2005 in the northern part of Lebanon, between Terbol and Menyeh. The lines were used on specific days to observe Mr. Hariri’s habitual movements, mostly in the area of Beirut.”

-  “On February 14, 2005, six lines were used in the area stretching from Parliament Square to the Saint Georges Hotel and the axes of Zqaq el Blat and Al Bachoura. The phone calls occurred at 11:00 hrs and covered all routes linking the Parliament to Kuraytem palace. The telephone located at the Parliament made four phone calls to the other telephones at 12:53 hrs, the time when Hariri’s motorcade left Nejmeh Square. The telephones have been inactive since the blast at 12:56 hrs. The lines were only used to make calls with each other for the entire period from early January to February 14, 2005.”

-  “It is the commission’s view that the assassination on February 14, 2005 was carried out by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources and capabilities. The assassination had been prepared over the course of several months. For this purpose the timing and location of Hariri’s movements had been monitored and the itineraries of his convoy recoded in detail.”

-  “Building on the findings of the Commission and the Lebanese investigations so far, and on the basis of the material and documentary evidence collected, and the leads pursued to date, there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act. It is a well known fact that Syrian Military Intelligence had a pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of Syrian forces pursuant to resolution 1959. The former senior security officials of Lebanon were their appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.”

-  “It is the commission’s conclusion after having interviewed witnesses and suspects in the Syrian Arab Republic and establishing that many leads point directly towards Syrian security officials as being involved with the assassination, it is incumbent upon Syria to clarify a considerable part of the unresolved questions. While the Syrian authorities, after initial hesitation, have cooperated to a limited degree with the commission, several interviewees tried to mislead the investigation by giving false or inaccurate statements. It has been proved that the letter addressed to the commission by the Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic contained false statements. The full picture of the assassination can only be reached through and extensive and credible investigation that would be conducted in a clear and transparent manner to the full satisfaction of international scrutiny.”

Mehlis’ second report: December 12, 2005: Reiteration of past accusations

Mehlis second report which was released a few hours after the assassination of MP Jubran Twaini reiterated the former accusations held by the first report against Syria. The report was submitted following interviews between the commission and five Syrian officials at a UN headquarters in Austria. The report asserted the presence of new evidence that corroborates the involvement of both Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services in the assassination. The commission reported having prepared two telephone databases to facilitate further analysis of the phone calls which lead to identifying the prepaid card user who called Al-Jazeera on 14 February. The commission interviewed the user in question and followed up on identifying and tracing the whereabouts and the telecoms pertaining to the prepaid cards circle including 8 special numbers and 10 mobile phones used in the surveillance and assassination of Hariri.

Brammertz’ first report: no finger pointing and Syrian cooperation bears fruit.

Detlev Mehlis, whose mandate expired at the end of December 2005, wished to stay in Germany and did not want to be reappointed. On January 11, 2006, Secretary General Kofi Anan appointed the Belgium Judge Serge Brammertz as new commissioner of the investigation and successor of Mehlis. Brammertz first report (the commission’s third) featured reserve and generalization and restrained from pointing any Syrian involvement with the assassination. Rather, it emphasized the cooperation received from Syrian authorities and mentioned meetings held by the commission with high-ranking officials in Damascus (News circulated of a meeting with president basher Assad).

Brammertz’ second report: June 10, 2006: substantive progress and results due by fall time.

The report underlined potential links between the assassination of Hariri and that of anti-Syrian political and media figures and addressed the real and urgent need of Syrian cooperation to unravel all the lines of enquiry. A substantive progress in the investigation was revealed in the report and Brammertz expected the completion of the main lines of investigation by next fall including the results of forensic medicine and the final subsequent conclusions.

Brammertz’ third report: September 25, 2006: satisfactory Syrian cooperation

The report identified the nature of the group who carried out the assassination and highlighted that its plan was sufficiently professional in terms of coordination and flexibility in execution. The commission, who denied the allegations against Abou Adas, received great assistance from several countries with regard to wide-range investigation analysis. However, Syria’s cooperation remains paramount in advancing the progress of the investigation, noting that the Syrian assistance was satisfactory for the most part and there were regular meetings with senior Syrian officials to organize and facilitate witness interviews.

Brammertz’ fourth report: December 13, 2006: suppositions of the assassination

Brammertz believed that Syrian cooperation was generally satisfactory and disclosed that the suicide bomber who drove the Mitsubishi Canter van packed with high explosives wasn’t Lebanese and only spent his last two months in Lebanon. He reported that the investigation is coming a long way in identifying the persons who used the six telephones and that six assumptions were behind the murder:

-  Hariri’s stance on Resolution 1559

-  Lahhoud’s term extension

-  Hariri’s connections with regional and western countries

-  Hariri’s connections with An-Nahar

-  Hariri’s chances of winning May elections

-  Al-Madina scandal

The report believed there was indeed a connection between the Hariri murder and the other subsequent murders.

Brammertz’ fifth report: March 15, 2007: Identifying the suicide bomber and the telecoms role

The report demonstrated a substantive progress in collecting evidence and inferring the motive behind the assassination, and the satellite three-dimensional photos accessed by the commission provided information of key importance in that respect. The bomber had lived in a bullet-contaminated area before he turned 12 and moved into a suburban environment. The report points the surveillance of telephone lines that monitored the explosion and provided clues on the role of all accomplices in the preparation, planning, surveillance and execution of the murder in addition to the manner in which they predicted Hariri’s movements. According to the report, the commission initiated an investigation into the role of the six prepaid card users and the potential activities resulting thereof. These investigations support the ongoing telecommunications analysis project to satisfy a four-fold purpose:

-  To confirm the hypotheses suggesting that the cards could have been used by the group who executed the explosion.

-  To verify whether any other forms of telecommunications could have had occurred between the team members and other members to attest to the materialization of the attack.

-  To help the commission better understand the scenarios of the crime.

-  To perceive the bigger picture with regard to all possible activities performed by the team or to any locations they visited prior to the attack.

“This extensive analysis enabled the commission to build a clearer image of the role and activities of the explosion team and provided additional geographic and temporal investigation threads. Furthermore, it underlined the activities of other members suspected to have participated in the killing through the usage of the prepaid cards.”

“This detailed probing into the activity of the prepaid cards yielded paramount factors pertaining to the ongoing investigation including, but not limited to, a presumable definition of the role of all the parties who took part in the preparation, planning and execution of the attack besides the prediction of Hariri’s movements and of possible preceding attacks on Hariri’s life.”

Brammertz’ sixth report: July 12, 2007: Identifying individuals involved in the commission of the crime

The investigation made a progress in the line of inquiry around the identity of the individuals who were possibly involved in or informed of the assassination. The findings stated that the Mitsubishi van was sold to someone who might be engaged in the final preparation for the attack. The commission obtained information reporting that over 1,800 kg of explosives were used in the operation which was carried out by a suicide bomber rather than Abou Adas who appeared in the video claim of responsibility. The commission has required further information regarding the van that carried the explosives and pointed that the van left a Mitsubishi factory in Japan in February 2002 and was reported stolen in Kanagawa, Japan, in October 2004. The van was then shipped to the United Arab Emirates and transported to a showroom close to Tripoli in northern Lebanon in December 2004, where it was sold. The Commission has recently acquired information regarding the sale of the van to individuals who could be involved in the final preparation of the van for the attack on Rafik Hariri.

Regarding the identity of the suicide bomber, the commission’s findings remain that the suicide bomber was a male, probably between 20 and 25 years old, with short dark hair. The commission’s experts also reached the conclusion that “this individual lived in an urban environment for the first ten years of his life and in a rural environment during the last 10 years of his life.” The report further mentioned that its current frame of work is focusing on Hariri as an advocate of Resolution 1559 which urged the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the dissolving of militias in Lebanon. The report added that “while the events surrounding the adoption of Resolution 1559 still need further investigation, it is the commission’s assumption that these events contributed to the atmosphere which yielded the motives for the assassination.”

Regarding Syria, the report pointed that Damascus has facilitated the work of the commission and Syria’s cooperation was “generally satisfactory” noting that the commission will keep on demanding complete cooperation to the full satisfaction of its mission. Furthermore, the report warned that the deterioration in political and security conditions in the region is likely to halt the progress of the investigation in the coming months and attention was drawn to the fights between the Lebanese army and Islamic militants, the assassination of MP Walid Eido and the attack on the UNIFIL.

Brammertz’ seventh and last report: November 28, 2007: the suicide bomber unidentified

This report is the last for Brammertz whose mandate expires at the end of 2007 before the appointment of Canadian judge Daniel Bellmare.

The report pointed that the evidence assisted in the understanding of several aspects of the assassination, particularly those pertaining to the type of the explosives carried by the Mitshubishi Canter van and the individuals involved in the surveillance of the late Rafik Hariri. Moreover, it has been concluded that Ahmad Abou Adass who appeared in the video claim of responsibility received by Al-Jazeera’s television channel in Qatar was not the suicide bomber who carried out the attack on Rafik Hariri. Currently, the identity of the suicide bomber remains uncovered albeit the commission has reached a substantive progress in identifying his Middle Eastern origins without reporting any details in that respect. The commission asserted that the unrevealed evidence regarding the attacks on Hariri and others, including the assassination of MP Antoine Ghanem, demonstrates that the perpetrators did and still possess advanced and extensive operational capabilities in Beirut. The commission pointed its need to maintain confidentiality of its information to avoid jeopardizing the integrity of the investigation as well as the safety of the witnesses and reiterated its call for the establishment of a witness-protection program.

Bellmare’s first report: March 28, 2008: Syrian cooperation

Bellmare assumed his duties as commissioner of the investigation on January 1, 2008 (he was appointed on 16 October 2007) and delivered his first report, the commission’s tenth, on March 28, 2008. The report asserted that there is evidence of connection between the Hariri murder and the other killings committed ever since Marwan Hamadeh assassination attempt at the end of 2004. The commission highlighted Syrian cooperation and described it as “generally satisfactory” and attention was drawn to past crimes such as the assassination of General Francois el-Hajj and Major Wissam Eid.

Bellmare’s second report: December 2, 2008: Further findings

The report pointed that the commission has received new information that would implicate new individuals in the network that carried out the assassination in addition to further findings that would assist in determining the geographic origins of the suicide bomber. The report also highlighted factors attesting to a connection between the Hariri murder and the other killings and assassinations and the commission underlined Syrian cooperation and requested to extend its mandate until February 28, 2009 (the mandate expires on January 31, 2008) to complete consistent investigations.

The indictment: August 17, 2011: Phone calls link Hezbollah members to the assassination

On June 10, 2011, the prosecutor Danielle Bellmare submitted his indictment to the tribunal which unsealed it on August 17, 2011 after six years of investigation. The indictment contained the following:

The individuals implicated in the assassination are the four Hezbollah members Mostafa Badreddine, Saleem Ayyash, Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Sabra and the case against the Accused was built in large part on circumstantial evidence.

According to the indictment, “circumstantial evidence which works logically by inference and deduction, is usually more reliable than direct evidence which can suffer from first-hand memory loss or eye-witness distortion. It is a recognized legal principle that circumstantial evidence has similar weight as direct evidence and can be even stronger sometimes.”

The report summarized the respective roles of the Accused as follows:

“Badreddine served as the overall controller of the operation. Ayyash coordinated the assassination team which was responsible for the physical perpetration of the attack while Oneissi and Sabra had the task of preparing the false claim of responsibility to mislead the investigation thus shielding the conspirators from justice.”

The evidence compiled throughout the investigation including witness statements, documentary evidence and Call Data Records (CDR) for mobile phones in Lebanon has led to the identification of the persons implicated in the assassination and the investigation traced five covert and open mobile-phone networks.

After drawing extensively on telecoms evidence, the indictment reaches its conclusion and the report mentions 12 times the sentence: “it may be reasonably concluded”.

The indictment claimed that the TNT explosives weighed 2500 kg rather than 1800 as was previously reported and the identity of the suicide bomber remains unknown.

After six years of consistent investigations, and the publication of 11 reports leading to the indictment, it does not seem that the investigations relied on solid evidence. While fingers were pointed to the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence bodies during Mehlis mandate, confidentiality prevailed when Brammertz took office until Bellmare’s report which implicated members of Hezbollah building on telecoms evidence that gained little if any attention in earlier stages. Ironically, the Lebanese are awaiting the tribunal to know the truth!

“It May Be Reasonably Concluded” mentioned 12 times in the Indictment

Prosecuter Daniel Bellemare submitted his indictment to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Pre-Trial judge Daniel Franseen on August 10, 2010. Significant parts of the indictment were unsealed on August 17, 2011 and contained the 12-time repeated phrase “It may be reasonably concluded.”

-  “It may be reasonably concluded from the said instances (the usage of Red Network phones, as well as other phones, including a Green Network phone and blue phones, at the same place, on the same date, and within the same timeframe) that one person is using multiple phones all at once, when over a lengthy period of time, the patterns of use for each phone never vary in an inexplicable manner.”

-  “It may be reasonably concluded that the activity of the Red Network phones on February 14, 2005 shows the execution of the attack on Hariri.”

-  “It is reasonable to conclude that phone use in the Red Network doesn’t suggest innocent or coincidental communications.”

-  “It may be reasonably concluded that the movement of the Mitsubishi Canter van within two minutes of the arrival of the convoy cannot be coincidental.”

-  “It can be reasonably concluded that the background of Badreddine as a man experienced in committing terrorist acts corroborates that his alias is Sami Issa.”

-  “It is reasonable to conclude that Ayash was responsible of monitoring the false claim preparation.”

-  “It is reasonable to conclude by comparing the movements of Rafik Hariri and the synchronic movements of the Blue Phones and Red Network Phones that these observational periods were preparatory steps for the assassination.”

-  “It is reasonable conclusion from these calls that Badreddine authorized Ayyash to purchase the Mitsubishi Canter van.”

-  “It is reasonable to conclude from the last Green Network call that Badreddine issued the final authorization to carry out the attack.”

-  “It may be reasonably concluded from these communications that the assassination team member on Red informed Ayyash and another member on Red of the departure of Hariri from Parliament so that the van could assume its final position for attack.”

-  “It may be reasonably concluded that Badreddine and Ayyash had the capability of executing the February 14, 2005 attack.”

-  “It is reasonable conclusion that the aim of the conspiracy sustained by all the accomplices is committing a terrorist act by detonating a large quantity of high explosives in a public place to assassinate Hariri.”

Tribunal and Investigation cost: LBP 143.5 billion

Ever since the establishment of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission, followed by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Lebanese financial contribution to the tribunal has reached LBP 95 billion distributed as follows:

- LBP 16.1 billion covering the commission’s residence and transportation expenses. These allocations were provided pursuant to decrees approved by the cabinet. The decrees suggested allocating funds from the Budget Reserve to the commission through the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the clause “Internal Delegations and Conferences”. The said funds included a LBP 1.1 billion allocation to the Ministry of Justice in favor of the Court of Cassation as well as the installation of cameras facing the houses of all individuals concerned with the STL.

-79 billion financial as Lebanon undertakes 49% of the total budget allocated for the tribunal. These amounts were paid pursuant to decrees granting the Ministry of Justice treasury loans to be paid from the General Budget allocations. Lebanon is now due to pay his 2011 LBP 32.2 billion share.