WHITHER EGYPT’S REVOLT

George T. Yacoub^©

It is too early to attempt any meaningful analysis, let alone predict the future direction and final outcome of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, in progress since January 2011. However, live scenes of massive demonstrations on the world’s TV screens calling for regime change prompt a number of observations and questions regarding the nature, goals, strategies and orientation of these uprisings.

This short note has a dual purpose. Its first and primary objective is to organize those observations and the questions they engender into a logical order which is conducive to further reflection and discussion. Its second goal is to emphasize the need to create large numbers of Inter-Arab “cyber platforms’ which could be used by political activists, old and young, to engage in serious debate and to cooperate on reforming and changing the socio-political systems of their respective communities. The Arab masses have proven that they possess the political will and determination to deploy their newly found “people’s power” in enforcing change and progress compatible with their cultural heritage and core values, and in tandem with the spirit of the age and with other “different” civilizations^[1]. This generation of Arab youth, having mustered the tools provided by the new communication and information technologies, should use those tools to share their ideas and experiences on how best to promote and sustain pan-Arab political, economic and social reforms. Contrary to conventional wisdom, and despite their dismal economic plight, the demand of the Arab masses has not been for “bread” but for “dignity”, freedom and justice.^[2]

This note focuses exclusively on the Egyptian revolution because, regardless of its final outcome, it will make a profound and far reaching impact on the entire Middle East^[3]. The importance of Egypt in this respect stems from its central geographic location, strategic weight and its leadership of the Arab world’s political, social-economic and even cultural transformations during the last two centuries. This current revolution is Egypt’s third. The first was initiated by Mohamed Ali early in the Nineteenth Century. He broke with the Ottoman Empire setting Egypt on the path to statehood and modernization, making it the political and cultural hub of the Arab World. The revolution led by Nasser in 1952 was Egypt’s second and most important. It was one of national liberation and social justice, establishing Egypt as the uncontested leader of the Arab World and as a regional power to be reckoned with. Egypt’s 1952 revolution was instrumental in assisting those Arab countries still under foreign occupation to gain their independence, dramatically changing the political landscape of the Arab world. Although both revolutions enjoyed considerable popular support they were conducted by the military rather than by the masses. It is important to note that both were perceived by the Western Powers of the day as a threat. Their leaders were regarded as a dangerous menace to be eradicated by all available means, including war and occupation.

Arabs Are Human After All

Early in January 2011, the Tunisian and Egyptian masses took to the streets in huge peaceful demonstrations calling for the ouster of their rulers and demanding freedom, justice and democracy. Most people round the world including political leaders, commentators and pundits, were taken by surprise, though the writing on the wall had warned for years that the prevailing status-quo, applauded in the West as moderation and stability, was misleading and unsustainable. This myopic perception is due to a long standing cultural stereotyping of the Arabs aimed at dehumanizing them and trivializing their beliefs, value systems and aspirations. It provokes two basic questions:

How could the Western Powers with their sophisticated intelligence assets, their envoys’ direct access to centers of power and their numerous expensive think-tanks miss the tremors and tectonic shifts shaking the foundations of the entire Arab state system?

How could the Arab ruling classes remain so callously oblivious to the suffering and deprivation of their masses and disdainful of their basic human dignity and needs? Did they really believe they were omnipotent and the people helplessly servile? Answering the above questions will explain the causes of such failures and go a long way in clarifying their historical background. Although such an exercise falls outside the limited scope of this note, a brief summary will suffice to shed some light on their root causes. For centuries, Western Powers have held the Arabs and their Muslim culture in low esteem, even utter contempt. Since the crusades, the Catholic Church has led a relentless campaign, depicting the Muslim Arabs as the devil incarnate and as infidel enemies. The so-called European Orientalists followed suit. Travelling throughout the Arab World during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as historians, adventurers and missionaries, they served as reconnaissance vanguards for forthcoming imperial designs.  Most, though not all, described the Arabs as backward, “shifty”, and incorrigibly irrational. In the twentieth century, especially since the establishment of the Jewish State in 1948, a strong lobby of neo-orientalists, based mainly in the United States and Israel, has maintained the anti-Arab campaign on a much larger scale. Their goal has been to dehumanize the Arab people, trivialize their culture and debase their religious beliefs. Hundreds of academic books and articles have been published to prove that Muslim Arabs are culturally ossified, intellectually inferior, hopelessly resistant to progress, innately undemocratic and driven by blind hatred and religious fanaticism against the West and its civilization. The Arab people are portrayed as sinister terrorists who are stubbornly opposed to the basic human aspirations of freedom, human rights and representative governance.  Since 9/11, this campaign, led by the neo-conservatives in the US and Israel, has become more vicious and dangerous. In Iraq, the Bush administration under the guise of bringing democracy to the Iraqi people waged a devastating war which has all but demolished the country^[4].

The Arab ruling classes are no better. With the approval and protection of many a Western Power they have established authoritarian regimes reinforced by brigades of internal security forces trained and equipped by the USA and its allies. The most important mission of these forces has been to maintain the ruling classes in power by force, rigged elections and corrupt government. Having established total control over the state’s resources and its instruments of coercion, they have tried to pacify their masses either by token handouts or repressive brute force. The USA and the countries of the European Union were fully aware of their protégés “undemocratic practices”, but continued to support them because they served their respective national interests. Having no real legitimacy and being totally dependent for their survival on outside support, the people have rightly perceived them as puppets dancing to the tunes and manipulations of their external masters.

In the wake of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, Western political leaders, academics and commentators on Middle Eastern affairs have discovered that the Arabs  are after all human beings with feelings, aspirations and hopes for freedom and better lives. To many of those in the West, this new revelation about the Arabs being cognizant of their right to democratic representation, justice and the rule of law and their willingness to sacrifice their lives to attain those rights, has been not only unexpected but also unbelievably bold^[5]. The Arab masses, hitherto assumed to be violently destructive and at the same time fearful of their masters, demonstrated live to the world’s public that they are perfectly capable of reclaiming their basic human rights and dignity peacefully and by “democratic means”. Equally, rulers across the Arab World have been jolted by the fearless determination of the masses to defy their security forces and demand their departure.  The rulers in other Arab states, realizing that the protesters in Egypt and Tunisia succeeded in deposing Presidents Ben-Ali and Mubarak, have rushed to offer pay increases, subsidized goods and promises for freedom and political reforms, hoping to pacify the people and avoid the fate of the Egyptian and Tunisian despots.

Was There a Master Plan?

It was noted at the outset that any serious attempt to explain the unprecedented demonstrations storming the squares and streets of Egypt since January 24^th 2011, is premature at this point in time. However, during the past few weeks, as these demonstrations have evolved into what looks like a fully fledged revolution, certain recurring demands, characteristics and behavior patterns are becoming readily recognizable raising numerous pivotal questions such as:

_-       Was there a preconceived master plan to mobilize, organize, initiate and manage the unprecedented mass demonstrations erupting suddenly and instantaneously throughout Egypt?

_-       Are there any discernible prerequisites and conditions to cause such massive popular uprisings? More specifically, does a revolution of the magnitude of Egypt’s require the existence of a highly charged and agitated popular critical mass to allow its spontaneous initiation creating a sustainable chain reaction capable of generating the necessary pressure for forcing change and reform, especially in autocratic regimes?

_-       What motivated such huge numbers of people to rally around a common purpose with a set of clear and prioritized objectives regardless of background, social status, education and vested interest, overcoming their fear of their repressive governments and despite considerable personal dangers?

_-       Who was leading the revolution and how did such leadership evolve to coordinate and guide large numbers of people spread over the whole country and separated by considerable distances?

_-       How did they muster the tools provided by the highly sophisticated information and communications technologies and deploy them in the service of the revolution?

_-       How is the emerging leadership of the revolution going to deal with the opposition and infiltration of its domestic foes, and how will it cope with foreign intervention bent on derailing it or redirecting its course away from its objectives and Egypt’s core national interests?

_-       By what means were hundreds of thousands of highly-charged demonstrators motivated to man the squares and streets day and night for weeks, despite continuous provocation, physical assault and other measures of intimidation by the Mubarak regime’s huge security apparatus?

What mechanisms were deployed to ensure that the demonstrations remained peaceful, disciplined and singularly focused on its primary objectives?

_-       How were the demonstrators supported with slogans, favorable media coverage and logistical needs such as shelter, nourishment, medical services and communications?

_-       Finally, how can the hesitant conduct of the Military High Command be explained? As the demonstrations gathered momentum, the military top brass seemed to be giving in to the demands of the demonstrators gradually, if begrudgingly, why?  Did they acquiesce willingly to the pressure from the streets or was this a tactical deployment of soft power to absorb the anger and discontent of the masses momentarily, buying time to abort the revolution later?

Trying to find quick answers is neither easy nor usefully revealing because of the dynamic nature and complexity of the issues involved, as well as the overwhelming speed at which the events on the streets have developed. Nevertheless, a brief review of the more salient observations engendering those questions will place them in context, providing a framework for further investigation and debate. These fall under three topics namely, nature and goals, leadership and modus operandi, intervention and opposition. The first two will be discussed in this section while the latter will be addressed separately in the next section. Intervention is accorded a special importance in view of the crucial role it occupies in the history of Egypt’s revolutions. It was successfully deployed by the Western powers to redirect and abort the earlier two revolutions of Mohammad Ali and Nasser, and is today being exercised again to influence the immediate outcome of the current revolution and direct its long term orientation.

The demonstrations which erupted in Cairo spread within hours to engulf the squares and streets of nearly all cities, towns and even villages from one end of the country to the other. Their gargantuan size, spontaneity and discipline were beyond any imagination. People of different social classes, age groups and educational backgrounds took to the streets, peacefully and fearlessly, demanding political reforms, primarily the removal of President Mubarak and his regime. Other demands, including the promulgation of a new constitution and electoral laws, the dismissal of the two legislative assemblies and the end to corruption and kleptocracy were voiced, but in a much lower key. This indicated that the revolution’s demands were logically ordered and prioritized, leaving little place for the jingoism and confusion which usually accompany such massive gatherings in the Arab World.

Furthermore, the principal demands were articulated in clear and simple terms. They were instantly understood and adopted by the masses, becoming the singular and uniform battle cry throughout the country.  The determination and focus of the demonstrators on their demands and their steadfastness for weeks in the streets was remarkable. Equally so was their resilience and ability to improvise remedies for the difficult problems and numerous challenges they were made to face.

Maintaining their peaceful posture, the demonstrators remained focused, vigilant and capable of defending themselves against the vicious attacks by the regime’s security forces and its henchmen, better known as the ‘Baltagia”. Another remarkable observation was the ingenuity displayed in overcoming difficult logistical problems such as the provision of food and water, shelter, medical services and the attention of the world media.

Though the eruptions were sudden and spontaneous, the revolution’s gestation was long and arduous, extending nearly forty years back. In any conversation with ordinary Egyptians in the inner streets of Egypt’s cities and towns, it was difficult to miss the heightening socio-economic tensions and political discontent. Increasing numbers, and across the social divide, complained loudly about the injustices and deprivation they had to suffer under Mubarak’s regime. Most striking was their anger at a president and his regime which was robbing them of their dignity as human beings and their national pride as Egyptian Arabs. Abuse of political freedom, repression, social and economic injustices, corrupt governance and callous persistence in disregarding people’s hopes and aspirations were instrumental in creating the critical mass of popular discontent, a prerequisite for any successful uprising of the masses.

 If the long standing grievances of the majority of the population were responsible for creating the necessary popular critical mass, the user-friendly tools of the information and communications technologies available to large numbers at affordable prices provided the means to agitate and eventually detonate this necessary critical mass. This resulted in a sustained chain reaction and generated the tremendous pressure required to achieve effective change, witnessed graphically on the World’s media networks. The future of the Egyptian revolution will depend to a large extent on the sustainability and development of this chain reaction^[6].

The importance of using these new tools intelligently and with expertise to organize and successfully carry out the revolution cannot be overstated^[7]. They broke the regime’s monopoly over the mass media which transmitted only censured information serving the interests of the ruling clique. Furthermore, they facilitated the direct connection and interactions between thousands of people, unhindered by time and space, enabling them to share perceptions of their political and economic concerns, freely debate issues of national interest and exchange views on what should be done  to address them. As the use of these tools becomes more widespread, their potency will grow exponentially. This phenomenon has been described by Professor Shirky of New York University, who states that “as the communications landscape gets denser, more complex, and more participatory the networked population is gaining greater access to information, more opportunities to engage in public speech and an enhanced ability to undertake collective action”^[8]

 Clearly the instigators of the demonstrations had developed a common perception of the political and social problems plaguing the country, communicating them directly and convincingly to large numbers of people who came onto the streets to demonstrate and protest against Mubarak and his government.

There are no indications yet that the “young leaders of the Egyptian revolution” had a preconceived plan or system. However, their effective deployment of social networking tools to mobilize, motivate, direct and control the huge numbers of demonstrators displayed an acute sense of strategy and familiarity with the fundamentals of strategic planning. As the demonstrations continued and the numbers swelled, the momentum therefore kept increasing, yet discipline was maintained despite relentless attacks by the security forces and harassment by the regime’s henchmen. Additionally, and within a short period, the demonstrators managed to neutralize both the internal security forces and the state media, thus depriving the regime of its most important weapons. Live TV pictures showed people in their thousands crammed in Cairo’s Tahrir Square maintaining daily twenty four hour vigils. The masses continued to demonstrate, responding promptly to calls from the revolution’s leadership. With or without prior planning, the services provided to the demonstrators to support their steadfastness ranged from safety and protection, to medical services, life-support requirements and media coverage. This was accomplished by the demonstrators themselves, who were organized into functional teams detailed to effect a variety of tasks and missions. Clearly the demonstrators’ leadership understood the nature of the networking tools at their disposal and deployed them tactically to address new problems and the ever-changing challenges developing daily on the street without losing sight of the revolution’s strategic goals.

Another noteworthy observation was the demonstrators’ dexterity and skill in coexisting peacefully and amicably with members of the armed forces on the street. During the first few days, the Army High Command was obviously uncertain how to handle the demonstrations and was hesitant in taking any serious action against them. The military top brass decided to wait and see how strong the protests would grow and how far they would go. Intimidation tactics were used, such as mock attacks by low-flying F16 fighter jets and helicopters. The demonstrators ignored them, and were neither intimidated nor deterred. Faced with unrelenting and practically unstoppable mass protests, the Armed Forces High Command declared more than once that the army would not be used against the demonstrators. Regardless of the reasons behind this decision, the army’s virtual neutrality gave the demonstrators a greater freedom of action and at the same time deprived the regime of an extremely important weapon to stop the demonstrations.

The leadership of Egypt’s revolution is its most striking feature. Yet it is also the most difficult aspect to unravel and explain as there is very little information on its members, their organizational structure and long-term objectives. During the first few weeks of protests, their posture was so low-keyed, it was as if they hardly existed and these huge masses appeared to be organized and directed by an “invisible hand”.

Many thought that this lack of visible leadership would be the revolution’s fatal weakness. The Mubarak regime scorned them as the “Facebook kids” who would soon get tired and go home. Several old-school politicians perceived a leadership vacuum and rushed to Tahrir Square in Cairo, presenting themselves as the “wise men” of politics and ready to take charge. The demonstration leaders, and the masses themselves, ignored the regime’s contempt and rejected the opportunism of these so-called wise men, dismissing them as irrelevancies.^[9]

Several weeks were to elapse before the revolution’s leadership began showing themselves to a media anxious to learn more. Though information on these leaders, and their thoughts on the future of the revolution, remains scanty, there is now enough material to draw a rough sketch of their main characteristics.

Whilst the leaders of Egypt’s two earlier revolutions came from the military establishment and imposed their movement from top to bottom, these new leaders are civilians with a highly-tuned civic awareness and are working this revolution from the grassroots up. They act more as “true citizens”^[10], rather than as the traditional Arab activists who have usually sought power to further their narrow class interests or serve their ideological fantasies.

These new political activists are young, educated, articulate, open to the new ideas of the age and well versed in the techniques of social networking. They led the masses from the front, being continuously among them, and by example. Thus they were able to reach the hearts and minds of ordinary men and women by showing sensitivity to their grievances as well as to their hopes and aspirations. Most important of all, they succeeded in gaining the confidence of a skeptical public so frequently let down by its political leadership.

In observing the successful management and direction of the revolution, it becomes clear that these young leaders have displayed a striking ability for strategic thinking. This is illustrated by their skills and by their capability of defining their objectives in clear and simple terms, of prioritizing them in order of importance and urgency, and then communicating them to the masses. These same skills and dexterity were much in evidence in their ability to mobilize the crowds, maintain them in peaceful order, service them logistically and keep them focused on the revolution’s primary objectives.

It is amazing how these young leaders were able to catch the attention of millions of people and convince them to listen to their message. Certainly their expertise in communication and information technology was crucial to their success, but how they extended their reach so far and so effectively is still mystifying. That they convinced masses participating in highly-charged demonstrations that social change and political freedom can be attained without fear, that social justice can be realized without violence and that clean governance can be claimed without vindictiveness is little short of miraculous.

Intervention and Suppression

It is impossible to study and explain the development of contemporary Arab politics without making reference to the role played by foreign intervention and domestic suppression. The recent Egyptian revolution, which had to address both challenges, is no exception. Both the policy and practice of intervention and repression have been omnipresent in Egypt for nearly two centuries and have had a significant impact on all attempts to transform the country’s social and economic condition and to modernize its political system.

Though conceptually different, foreign intervention and domestic suppression share certain similarities. Both are aimed at enforcing the will of their respective progenitors on their targets, and with violence if necessary.^[11] In the case of foreign intervention, one country uses or threatens to use military force, or enters into subversive tactics to compel another country to do its will. Domestic suppression is the practice of governments, usually authoritarian, to deploy the state’s instruments of power to quell dissent and terminate opposition.

During the early days of Egypt’s revolution, and with no leadership in sight, there was real concern that this fledgling uprising might prove unable to overcome the dual challenge of domestic suppression and foreign intervention. Mubarak, with the support and assistance of his Western mentors, was well-prepared for such eventualities. Similarly, USA-led interventionists, active since Sadat’s advent to power, had infiltrated government institutions to ensure that the regime continued to serve American political, security and economic interests. The impact of this interventionism was reflected in Egypt’s own foreign and security policies, particularly towards the Middle East. That such policies were unacceptable to most Egyptians, had isolated Egypt, and had diminished its leading regional role did not matter as long as Mubarak had the means to suppress opposition and serve the interests of the United States.^[12] In this respect, the following observations are striking:

Despite its previous power, Mubarak’s well-trained, well-equipped and extensive internal security system disintegrated quickly.

 Mubarak and his regime were relegated to outcast status, and this despite thirty years of loyally serving the interests of his master and ally, The United States. Mubarak, his family and his cabal, have been disowned by their mentors in the West, even being refused a country of refuge. They are now as untouchable as a soiled tissue, and have been simply flushed out of sight.

To add insult to injury, as soon as Mubarak and his entourage outlived their usefulness, they were mercilessly exposed as blood-thirsty dictators, greedy embezzlers and kleptocrats. Their former supporters and mentors, having forgotten that he was once their most trusted ally in an otherwise treacherous region, raced each other to see who could freeze his assets fastest and thus impoverish him.

What is incomprehensible is not the fact that petty despots in the Middle East are discarded once they become useless and embarrassing to their erstwhile masters, but that they steadfastly refuse to learn the “Laws of International Puppeteering” which have governed this region for several decades. Simply stated, they are as follows:

The first Law of International Puppeteering states that Puppets can never become masters. Once they sell their souls to the puppet master, the latter practically owns them and controls their actions, destiny and fate.^[13]

The second law decrees that Puppets, regardless of their role or the brilliance of their performance, are utterly disposable. When their usefulness expires, they will be ruthlessly discarded by their masters.

The third law ordains that Puppets should never expect safe quarters from their masters. No matter how valuable their past service, they will be given neither a reprieve nor a decent send-off.

Mr Mubarak is not the first; nor will he be the last puppet to be abandoned by his masters and delivered to the World Hall of Puppet Shame. Many have gone before him; most recently Ben Ali of Tunisia. Notable discarded puppets are the Shah of Iran and Manuel Noriega of Panama. Others in the Middle East are already treading the same path and will suffer the same fate sooner rather than later.

Every form and tactic of domestic suppression practices were in evidence in Egypt’s squares and streets as the Mubarak regime tried to counter the ever-growing revolution. Two significant observations leap to the fore. Firstly, Mubarak deployed the maximum range of domestic suppression, built up over his thirty year presidency, but to no avail. Secondly, he stubbornly refused to yield to the demands of the demonstrators, until extreme pressure was exerted and then only in tiny incremental steps.

Taken by surprise during the first few days, Mubarak and his regime failed to appreciate the seriousness of their predicament. As the demonstrations swelled and spread, the demands of the protestors becoming louder and bolder, the real threat to the regime’s survival became clear, hence his swift and fierce response. He utilized the police, special storm troopers trained and equipped for crowd control, anti-terrorist paramilitary squads and thousands of secret policemen and their informers. This massive force of coercion failed in its mission and collapsed, virtually vanishing from the streets. In a last ditch attempt to save his regime, Mubarak resorted to hired thugs and his National Party gangs to attack and injure demonstrators. This too was a fiasco, and the refusal of the armed forces to participate left Mubarak isolated and virtually powerless.

The hour of reckoning had arrived. Still convinced that his “friends” inside Egypt and abroad would come to his rescue, Mubarak prevaricated, attempting to pacify the demonstrators with gestures and further insignificant steps towards reform. Predictably, that also failed. The demonstrators had rightly intuited the end of his regime was imminent and were confident in their demands for its removal.

In  his first televised appearance for months, Mubarak conceded that he would not seek another term and promised vague political reforms. His insincerity was patent, convincing no-one. Still posturing as the Head of State and in charge, he appointed his first Vice-President for three decades, sacked the cabinet and named a new Prime Minister. That too failed. The protest movement was steadfast; the pressure from the street unrelenting. Finally, taking the advice of his overseas allies and probably the Egyptian army’s top brass, he resigned and handed his presidential authorities to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Mubarak the president was gone, but his regime remained.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces accepted its new task, promising to restore order and satisfy the demands of the revolution. However, it seemed reluctant to make any real changes, especially in relation to the regime’s key men. Though the military chiefs had not prevented Mubarak’s removal and had adopted a neutral position between the regime and the demonstrators, they now appeared to be retaining as much of the former administration as possible.^[14] Sustained pressure by demonstrators who refused to abandon the streets, compounded by the fear of a possible mutiny from lower ranks,^[15] eventually convinced the Supreme Military Council to remove the Council of Ministers appointed by Mubarak and replace it with ministers acceptable to the majority of protestors. Clearly, the Armed Forces Supreme Council must establish a balance between the demands of the demonstrators, its own substantial interests in the regime and external pressures from interventionist Western Powers. This is a difficult task because the interests of the parties involved are different and often contradictory.

Foreign intervention, especially by the United States, is certain to continue. The United States has dominated Egypt’s foreign and security policies since the Camp David Accords with President Sadat, their investment being both costly and of long duration. America will employ all means possible to ensure that this revolution does not jeopardize US interests in the Middle East and specifically, the safety and security of Israel. Other nations have supported the United States in this and have made several declarations on this subject as events unfolded in Egypt. To date, however, both the United States and Israel have kept a low profile in real terms though there is no doubt that their emissaries will soon arrive on site to assess the damage, if any, to their relationships and explore future arrangements with Egypt’s new leaders.

The US Government knew that Mubarak’s regime was both hated and vulnerable but chose not to react until after the Tunisian revolution. It would be naïve to believe that the meeting between Egypt’s most senior military chiefs and the US National Security Community, held in the Pentagon, was a routine exchange of courtesies. Its most plausible purpose was to map out the response should the same situation occur in Egypt, the hasty return of the Egyptian delegation to Cairo as the demonstrations started is a case in point.

The revolution’s leaders have concentrated on internal political reform and on fulfilling the demands of the protestors. There has been a noticeable lack of pronouncement on Egypt’s future foreign and security policies, especially with reference to Israel. A change in Egyptian-Israeli relations is almost certain, but the nature and extent of this possible change is currently difficult to predict.

Looking ahead

Returning to the title of this note, Whither Egypt’s Revolt, the tantalizing question of what lies ahead begs an answer which is difficult to provide at this point in time. A second best approach is to make a few highly speculative and tentative deductions.

The preceding analysis examined the nature and modus operandi of the Egyptian revolution as it removed Mubarak and his regime from power. The remainder of this note will explore briefly what happens next, focusing on the sustainability of the revolution and on how the new Egyptian regime will address challenges of national security and foreign policy, intervention, and civil-military relations.

The sustainability of Egypt’s revolution is the ultimate measure of success. Its achievement to date has been beyond expectations but this is only the first step in a long and difficult process which might last for years. Therefore, it is imperative that the new leadership keeps the purpose and objectives of the revolution in sharp focus and maintains its strong momentum by motivating the masses and by engaging their active participation in the country’s political life. A national consensus on how to achieve freedom, social justice, fair representation, as well as transparent and efficient governance will be required. Making the necessary constitutional, legal and institutional reforms will encounter both internal and external resistance. The Egyptian masses have been the main driving force behind the revolution and its success so far. To ensure their continued support and participation, they must perceive that the reforms are real and that they have a stake in them.

Following Sadat’s signature of the Camp David Accords in 1969, Egypt’s traditional foreign and national security policy based on “positive neutrality” was swiftly replaced by a totally pro-United States stratagem. There is abundant proof that this was unpopular both in Egypt and among the masses of the Arab world. Egypt became isolated and its historic role as the Arab World’s leading power diminished considerably. Soon the vacuum created by its defection from the Arab fold was filled by Turkey and Iran.

There are already signs that Mubarak’s foreign and security policy is destined to change under the new regime.^[16] The question occupying everyone’s mind is when this change will occur and what will be its extent.  The Mubarak-Sadat pro-US legacy is deeply entrenched, not only in Egypt’s officer corps, but also within its economic and governmental institutions. Though Mubarak and some of his acolytes have been forced out, many have retained their powerful positions and will be ready to derail the real and necessary reforms. It will demand determination and time to dismantle the long-standing support structure of Mubarak’s legacy. In this respect, the role of the Armed Forces senior echelons will be decisive.

It is naïve to presume that US intervention will cease, even if a democratically elected government is installed. Any change in Egypt’s political orientation, especially that of foreign and national security policy will be monitored by the US, Israel and their Western allies, and the effect of such changes on US interests will be carefully assessed. Needless to say, if those changes are perceived as harmful to American and Israeli interests, they will be vigorously opposed and, where possible, subverted. The United States’ present intervention in Egypt has been double-faced; simultaneously applauding the protestors while trying to save the influence it enjoyed under Mubarak. It will be fascinating to watch the US response to a drastic change in Egypt’s policies, enacted by a freely elected government and parliament. Previous experience in Algeria and Palestine does not bode well. Will the same happen in Egypt?

The remaining question is how will the Egyptian revolution affect the nation’s civil-military relations. Contemporary Egypt has been under the control of the military for many decades. Officers from the military establishment have not only dominated Egypt’s political life, but also its economic, financial and judicial institutions. Under Mubarak, the Ministry of Defense came to own and manage numerous commercial enterprises, in addition to the large defense industries they already controlled. How will a democratically elected government and an independent judiciary deal with such military dominance? It is difficult to take at face value the claim of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that they are anxious to return power to a democratic government and to withdraw to their barracks, thereby ceding the political and economic power they currently wield. How military–civil relations in the post-Mubarak period will develop remains an open question.

It is instructive to paraphrase Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ahmet Davudoglu who warns against disregarding the imperatives of history and geography in political planning. He says the following:

Elites who do not possess a distinctive identity and a determined political will for progress prefer to wobble in the shadows of the strategies of others instead of pursuing the venues extending through their own history and geography. To such people, history is regarded as a burden and not as cumulative cultural wealth, and geography is perceived not as latent power and a valuable strategic asset but a winning card to be presented to the bigger actors on the international arena for their approbation and protection.

Beirut, March 15^th, 2011©

George T. Yacoub Ph.D. is an analyst in strategic and security studies